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A NOTE ON FUNAKI AND YAMATO’S TRAGEDY OF THE
COMMONS
LA´SZLO´ A´. KO´CZY
Abstract. In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can
be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We
propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of
simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assump-
tions.
1. Introduction
Funaki and Yamato (1999) define a game with a common pool resource and tackle the
question whether or not the tragedy of the commons can be avoided. Their answer strongly
depends on the expectations regarding the coalition formation: if players have pessimistic
expectations the answer is positive. On the other hand with optimistic expectations the
tragedy of the commons cannot be avoided in games with at least 4 players.
In partition function form games a coalition’s payoff depends on the entire coalition
structure and so a deviation by a coalition invokes a response from the rest of the players.
On the other hand the payoff the deviating coalition obtains after the deviation depends
on this reaction, so the deviation happens with certain beliefs or expectations about the
reaction. While it is possible that the deviating coalition is indifferent about this reaction
– as is the case in the less general characteristic function games – such beliefs cannot be
removed completely. The optimistic and pessimistic assumptions of Funaki and Yamato
(1999) are extreme in the sense that players can be misled by an unlikely, though very
favourable or infavourable outcome. In a footnote they acknowledge this fact and suggest
to use intermediate cases by allowing some coalitions to be optimistic and others to be
pessimistic. In this note we take an even more general approach. We impose less restrictive
assumptions on the expectations, thereby allowing not only optimism and pessimism to
be present in a game, but also that these be present in a gradual way. The corresponding
core concepts refine their analysis.
First we give a brief overview of the model, then propose our new solution and close our
paper with some numerical simulations explaining the difference between our results and
those of Funaki and Yamato.
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2. The Model
Funaki and Yamato (1999) consider a game with a set N = {1, . . . , n} of identical
fishermen. Fisherman j exerts an effort lj to catch fish
1. The total amount of labour is
given by lN =
∑
j∈N lj. The production function f specifies the number of fish caught
for each value of the total amount of labour lN . We assume that f(0) = 0, f
′(lN) > 0,
f ′′(lN) < 0, and limlN→∞ f
′(lN) = 0, that is, there are decreasing returns to labour. The
distribution of fish is proportional to the effort of the individual fishermen. The price of
fish is normalised to 1, and the personal cost of labour is q. We assume that 0 < q < f ′(0).
The income of fisherman j is given by:
mj(l1, l2, . . . , ln) =
lj
lN
f(lN)− qxj,
where mj(0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0. We further assume that fishermen are allowed to form coalitions
and then for coalition S the coalitional income is simply mS =
∑
j∈Smj. For any given
coalition structure P = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk} the vector of efforts (l∗1, l∗2, . . . , l∗k) aggregated per
coalition is an equilibrium under the strategy vector P if it is a Nash-equilibrium with the
coalitions as composite players.
Given this model Funaki and Yamato (1999) prove the existence of a unique equilibrium
for any given coalition structure.
Lemma 1 (Funaki and Yamato, (1999), Theorem 1). For any coalition structure P =
{S1, S2, . . . , Sk}, there exists a unique equilibrium vector
(
l∗S1 , l
∗
S2
, . . . , l∗Sk
)
given by
f ′(l∗N) + (k − 1)f(l∗N)/l∗N = kq,(1)
l∗Si = l
∗
N/k for all i = 1, . . . , k, and(2)
l∗Si > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , k.(3)
3. Our proposal
The existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium enables us to define a partition function
form game. In this game a group of fishermen deviates if, unhappy with the given payoff
configuration, they form a new fishing firm. Since the deviation changes the payoffs of the
remaining coalitions it induces a reaction from the rest of the players. These players, called
residuals face a problem that can be modelled by a partition function form game. Since
the deviating players are considered “put” they only affect the game by their externalities,
and so the residual game has less players than the original one. Generally the deviation
creates a totally new situation and so the residual solution does not have to depend on the
pre-deviation payoffs of the residuals. In order to be consistent we assume –and this is our
only assumption– that the residual solution is in the residual core, provided it is not empty.
Since the core concept used here is a generalisation of the coalition structure core, it may
implement more than one partition. Thus uncertainty and expectations cannot entirely be
removed, but optimism and pessimism leads here to less extreme results.
1Instead of x we use l for the amount of labour.
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In the following we give a formal definition of the core concept. This definition is
inductive and is done if four steps. For a single-player game the core is straightforward.
Given the definition for all at most k − 1 player games we define domination for k player
games. First we give the definition for the pessimistic case, and then a slightly modified
version gives the optimistic core. As usual, the definition is based on the domination
relation.
Let (N,Π, V ) denote a partition function form game, where N is the set of players, Π
is the set of partitions of the players and V is the partition function. Then (x,P) shall
denote an outcome, where x is a feasible payoff vector under partition P such that P ∈ Π.
Set subscripts to relation symbols between real vectors mean a restriction of the relation.
Let x, y ∈ RN and S ⊆ N . Then we write x >S y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ S and xS > yS.
Similarly, we write x =S y if xi = yi for all i ∈ S.
First we define a residual game:
Definition 1 (Residual Game). Let (N,Π, v) be a game. Let S be a coalition and R be
its complement in N . Let S be a multi-coalition deviation2, a partition of S. Given the
deviation S the residual game (R,Π(R), vS), where Π(R) is the set of partitions of R, is
the partition function form game over the player set R and with the partition function
vS : Π(R) −→ (2R −→ R)
R 7−→ vS(R)
vS(R) : C 7−→
{
v(C,R∪ S) if C ∈ R
0 otherwise.
Definition 2 (Core). The definition consists of four steps. Let (N,Π, v) be a game.
Step 1. The core of a trivial game.
The core of a game with N = {1} is the efficient outcome with the trivial partition,
P0 = {{1}}:
C−({1} , {P0} , v) = {(v(1,P0),P0)} .
Step 2. Inductive assumption.
Given the definition of the core for every game with at most k − 1 players we can define
dominance for a game of k players.
Step 3a. Dominance (Pessimistic case)
For any set of deviating players S the deviating coalitions S represented as a partition of
S induces a residual game (R,Π(R), vS). Then the outcome (x,P) is dominated via a set
of coalitions S if either
(1) the core of the residual game is empty and for all residual outcomes the deviation
S is profitable. Formally: for all partitions Q containing S there exists an outcome
(y,Q) such that y >S x. Or
2For games in a partition function form the Pareto-efficiency of the undominated outcomes can only be
attained by allowing simultaneous deviations by more than one coalitions.
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(2) the core of the residual game is not empty and for all residual core outcomes the
deviation S is profitable. Formally: for all residual core outcomes (yR,R) there
exists an outcome (y,S ∪R) with a payoff vector y =S yR and y >S x3.
Step 3b. Dominance (Optimistic case).
For any set of deviating players S the deviating coalitions S represented as a partition of
S induces a residual game (R,Π(R), vS). Then the outcome (x,P) is dominated via a set
of coalitions S if either
(1) the core of the residual game is empty and there exists a residual outcome that
makes the deviation S profitable. Formally: there exists an outcome (y,Q), such
that Q contains S and y >S x.
(2) the core of the residual game is not empty and there exists a residual core outcome
that makes the deviation S profitable. Formally: there exists a residual core out-
come (yR,R), such that there exists an outcome (y,S ∪R), such that y =S yR and
y >S x.
The outcome (x,P) is dominated if it is dominated via a set of coalitions.
Step 4. The core (Pessimistic & optimistic cases).
The core of a game (N,Π, {vP}P∈Π) of k players is the set of undominated outcomes and
we denote it by C−(N,Π, {vP}P∈Π) and C+(N,Π, {vP}P∈Π) respectively for the pessimistic
and optimistic approaches.
The properties of the core together with its relation to other existing core and core-like
concepts are discussed in Ko´czy (2000) and to a greater extent in Ko´czy (2002). Here we
recall only one result. If Cmin and Cmax denote the pessimistic and optimistic cores used
by Funaki and Yamato (1999), then Cmax ⊆ C+ ⊆ C− ⊆ Cmin when applied to the same
game.
4. Simulations
We investigate three simple types of production functions. Depending on the choice for
the cost of labour q and a parameter γ (where applicable) the tragedy of the commons can
be avoided for some games. The three functions considered are the following:
f1(lN) = l
γ
N(4)
f2(lN) = 1− e−lN(5)
f3(lN) =
1
γ
(lN + 1)
γ − 1
γ
(6)
4.1. The function f(lN) = l
γ
N . This is a function that also Funaki and Yamato use to
illustrate that different γ values can lead to different results for 3-player games. We show
the calculation of the core for a specific example and give a summary of the results.
3Note the difference between the two cases: if the residual core is not empty we consider only core
outcomes (first case), while if it is empty we use all outcomes (second case).
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Consider a 4-player game with γ = 0.2 and q = 0.5. As lN tends to 0, f
′(lN) tends
to infinity so the conditions on q are satisfied. First we solve Equation (2) of Funaki and
Yamato (1999) for k = 1, 2, 3 and 4. The respective l∗N values are 0.318, 1.256, 1.614, and
1.799. The following table summarises the payoffs.
coalitional coalition per-member
Partition payoff size payoff
(4) 0.636 4 0.159
(3,1) 0.209 3 0.070
(3,1) 0.209 1 0.209
(2,2) 0.209 2 0.105
(2,1,1) 0.098 2 0.049
(2,1,1) 0.098 1 0.098
(1,1,1,1) 0.056 1 0.056
We test the profitability of deviations from the grand coalition. In the grand coalition
each player gets 0.159. The cooperation is threatened only by deviations that give more
to the deviating players. In our example there is only one such possibility, the singleton
in the partition (3, 1) gets 0.209. Under the overly optimistic max-assumption he expects
this amount, but is this belief realistic? We look at payoffs in the residual game consisting
of the remaining 3 players
Coalition partition per-member
size by size value value
3 (3) 0.209 0.070
2 (2,1) 0.098 0.049
1 (2,1) 0.098 0.098
1 (1,1,1) 0.056 0.056
Should the (residual) grand coalition form, each player would get 0.070. This can be
blocked by a singleton, provided the remaining two players stay together, and thus get
0.049 each. Since breaking up gives them more, 0.056, the deviation by the singleton is
not profitable. Hence, the grand coalition is in the core of the 3-player residual game.
Moreover, this implies that a deviation by a singleton in the original, 4-player game is also
profitable. Hence the grand coalition is not in the core, and the tragedy of the commons
cannot be avoided4.
A similar argument gives the same conclusion for other values of γ and q for all four or
five-player games.
4.2. The function f(lN) = 1− e−lN . Looking at 3, 4 and 5-player games we find that for
5-player games the grand coalition does not belong to the core; for 3 and 4 player games
there exists cutoff values so that if q < q̂ then the grand coalition belongs to the core, while
if q > q̂ it does not. We found q̂3 = 0.213 and q̂4 = 0.475.
4We must also note, however, that after the separation of a single player the rest of the players stay
together, and hence the overfishing is only to the extent of about 30%. This structure does of course
exhibit the usual instability of a cartel system.
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4.3. The function f(lN) =
1
γ
(lN + 1)
γ − 1
γ
. In this case we have an extra parameter, γ
and we find that depending on γ a similar cutoff value may exist, although here it works
in the other direction: for a given γ if q > q̂ then the grand coalition belongs to the core,
while if q < q̂ it does not. In particular, where the cutoff-value is 0 the grand coalition will
be stable for all values of q, while if it is 1 the tragedy of the commons cannot be avoided.
The following table and figure summarise our findings:
γ q̂3 q̂4 = q̂
−
5 q̂
+
5 = q̂6
0.1 0.191 0.617 1
0.3 0.175 0.645 1
0.5 0.121 0.687 1
0.584 0 0.711 1
0.7 0 0.754 1
0.704 0 0.756 1
0.9 0 0.881 1
6
-
q̂3
q̂4 = q̂
−
5
q̂+5 = q̂6
q
γ
0.5
0.5
5. Conclusions
Here, unlike with the min and the max approaches of Funaki and Yamato, the stability of
the grand coalition depends highly on the function considered and the parameters used, but
to a much lesser extent on the approach (optimistic or pessimistic) taken. The generality
of the results of Funaki and Yamato (1999) does not hold here nor could we establish other
regularity; numeric calculations for larger games become computationally too difficult.
References
Funaki Y, Yamato T (1999) The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function
form approach. International Journal of Game Theory 28(2):157–171
Ko´czy LA´ (2000) The core of a partition function game. Discussion Paper 00.25, Center for Economic
Studies, Leuven, November
Ko´czy LA´ (2002) The core in the presence of externalities. Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei,
Milan
Copyright © 2002 @ the author(s). Discussion papers are in draft form. This discussion paper 
is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without 
permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. 
 
 
